SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interestingchanges in significant areas of practice.
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MENT LIMITATIONS VIOLATES MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL

5.6.-Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 128 N.J.
10, 607 A.2d 142 (1991).

CONDUCT

Plaintiffs, Cynthia M. Jacob and Richard F. Collier, Jr., were
employees and shareholders of defendant-law firm Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus (NMM). 128 N.J. at 14, 607 A.2d at 144. Jacob and Collier, along with an associate, Sweet, left NMM in
October of 1987 to form the law firm of Collier, Jacob & Sweet.
Several NMM associates, a paralegal and clients worth an alleged
$500,000 in annual billings accompanied plaintiffs in the venture.
On February 11, 1986, the parties entered into two agreements governing the terms of plaintiffs' departure. The first, a
Buy-Sell Agreement, which was fully executed and not in dispute,
required NMM to purchase Jacob's and Collier's shares at predetermined values. The second, the Service-Termination Agreement (Agreement), governed the amount of compensation due
withdrawing members in excess of their equity interest in the
firm. It provided that such compensation was "[i]n consideration
of Member's services to the Law Firm." The Agreement, however, distinguished between non-competitive-voluntary and competitive-voluntary departures, denying compensation when an
attorney's departure was competitive. Id. at 15, 607 A.2d at 145.
Specifically, withdrawing members who, within one year of termination of employment, either retained NMM clients or NMM professional or paraprofessional staff (respectively the antisolicitation term and anti-raiding term), were considered to have
departed on a competitive basis and were not entitled to any termination compensation above their equity interest in the firm,
except the right to purchase life insurance. Id., 607 A.2d at 14445.
Pursuant to the Agreement,Jacob and Collier collectively requested $81,125 in termination compensation. Id., 607 A.2d at
145. NMM denied the request, maintaining that Jacob and Collier contravened the anti-solicitation term by retaining former
NMM clients. In addition, NMM argued that the plaintiffs violated the anti-raiding term by retaining several NMM associates
and a paralegal. Id. at 15-16, 607 A.2d at 145. Jacob and Collier
subsequently instituted suit in January of 1989, claiming that the
Agreement's competitive-departure provisions offended Rule of
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Professional Conduct (RPC) 5.6 and should be declared unenforceable as against public policy. Id. at 16, 607 A.2d at 145.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division held that
the Agreement's competitive-departure provisions violated RPC
5.6 by forcing departing members either to forego representing
former NMM clients or to forfeit termination compensation, and
by posing a strong disincentive against hiring professionals and
paraprofessionals of their choosing. Id. Positing that the competitive-departure provisions could be severed without defeating the
central aim of the Agreement - compensating withdrawing partners - the court awarded Jacob and Collier the compensation
set forth under the Agreement's non-competitive voluntary departure terms. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division reversed. Id. The appellate division noted that the anti-solicitation
term's potentially adverse impact on a departing member's continuing representation of clients. Id. (citing 247 N.J. Super. 266,
272, 588 A.2d 1287 (App. Div. 1991)). Nonetheless, the court
asserted that such an impact did not fall within Rule 5.6's prohibition of the restriction of the practice of law. Id. Although not
addressing the anti-raiding term, the court upheld the anti-solicitation term, observing that it permissibly balanced the requirements of withdrawing partners with the firm's sustained losses
upon an attorney's departure. Id. The appellate division further
contended that even if it refused to enforce the anti-solicitation
term, the term could not be severed and the Agreement would
therefore fail in its entirety. Id. at 17, 607 A.2d at 146 (quoting
247 N.J. Super. at 273, 588 A.2d 1287). Hence, in addition to
relying on equitable principles, the court enforced the Agreement's terms and refused to award plaintiffs the compensation
sought. Id. (citingJacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 247 N.J.
Super. at 273-74, 588 A.2d 1287). The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal, id. (citing
126 NJ. 340, 598 A.2d 896 (1991)), and reversed the appellate
division, finding that the Agreement's competitive-departure
provisions violated RPC 5.6 and were thus void as against public
policy. Id. at 36, 607 A.2d at 155.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for a unanimous court, first set
forth RPC 5.6 and its prohibition of any provision that directly or
indirectly interferes with an attorney's right to practice law after
termination of an employment relationship. Id. at 17-18, 607
A.2d at 146 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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Rule 5.6(a) (1983)). Although acknowledging the Rule's literal
language framed in terms of an attorney's right to practice, the
justice emphasized that the ultimate goal of RPC 5.6 is to guarantee clients' uninhibited right to counsel of their own choosing. Id.
at 18, 607 A.2d at 146.
Having set forth the impetus behind RPC 5.6, the supreme
court reviewed the rule from an historical perspective, detailing
the basis for the contemporary disdain for attorney-restrictive
covenants. Id. at 18-19, 607 A.2d at 146-47 (citations omitted).
In so doing, Justice Garibaldi reviewed RPC 5.6's precursor, Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) of the Model Code of Professional Con-

duct. Id. at 19, 607 A.2d at 147 (citing MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-108(A) (1980)). Because of
the similarity of DR 2-108(A), and the paucity of caselaw construing RPC 5.6, which New Jersey only enacted in 1984, the justice
analyzed the plaintiff's contentions in light of both provisions. Id.
Stressing the distinction between ordinary commercial relationships - governed by business principles, and the attorneyclient relationship - governed by ethical principles, the justice
noted that clients cannot be treated as 'merchandise' and have
their right to choice of counsel determined by a restrictive covenant to which they are not a party. Id. at 20, 607 A.2d at 147
(quoting Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch.
Div.), aff'd, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975)).
The justice then stated that, beyond peradventure, both RPC 5.6
and DR 2-108(A) preclude direct restrictions on the practice of
law. Id. at 19, 607 A.2d at 147. The court recognized that
although the anti-solicitation provision at issue was not a direct
restraint on the practice of law, it indirectly restrained competitive activity by denying departing attorneys compensation that
they would otherwise be entitled to. Id. at 22, 607 A.2d at 148.
For example, Justice Garibaldi posited, financial disincentive provisions undermine the attorney-client relationship by providing
the attorney with an "economic incentive" to discontinue representation, effectively nullifying a client's right to independently
choose counsel. Id. Buttressed by a myriad of disciplinary rules
and cases finding that financial disincentive provisions violate
RPC 5.6 and DR 2-108(A), the court determined that such indirect restraints are objectionable and as offensive to RPC 5.6 as an
outright prohibition on the practice of law. Id. at 23-24, 607 A.2d
at 149 (citations omitted).
Justice Garibaldi next addressed NMM's contention that it
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should be free to deny compensation in excess of a departing
member's equity interest in the firm. Id. at 24, 607 A.2d at 14950. Initially, the court questioned whether the termination compensation at issue should not be characterized as Jacob's and Collier's interest in the firm. Id. at 25, 607 A.2d at 150. The
Agreement, explained the justice, specifically stated that the compensation was in consideration of the departing member's service
to NMM. Id. The justice, however, refrained from resolving the
issue, stating that despite whether compensation is characterized
as "earned" or "additional," imposing conditions on an attorney's right to receive compensation violates the RPCs. Id. at 2526, 607 A.2d at 150.
Moreover, Justice Garibaldi refused to strictly construe RPC
5.6. Id. at 26-27, 607 A.2d at 150-51. In so doing, the justice
rejected NMM's argument that the Agreement merely softened
the harsh impact of the economic loss that a firm suffers when a
departing member solicits the firm's former clients. Id. at 27, 607
A.2d at 151. The court observed that the anti-solicitation provision operated as a penalty and therefore impermissibly restricted
the practice of law. Id. at 28, 607 A.2d at 151. The justice noted,
for example, that a departing attorney would forfeit all compensation under the Agreement if he continued to represent just one
client. Id. In such a case, where the firm sustained only minimal
financial damage, the anti-solicitation provision could not accurately be characterized as a mere ameliorative measure. Id. Reiterating that the RPCs were grounded upon ethical precepts in
contrast to commercial standards, the court maintained that client choice, not economic motives, must ultimately prevail. Id. at
27, 607 A.2d at 151.
Having determined that the Agreement's anti-solicitation
provision violated RPC 5.6, the justice conceded the harm that
departing firm members could inflict on a firm. Id. at 28, 607
A.2d at 151. The justice, however, added that firms could protect themselves through less onerous alternatives than restricting
client choice. Id. Cognizant of the decrease in a firm's goodwill
that occurs when withdrawing members retain firm clientele, the
court opined that firms could account for that factor in valuing
the compensation due upon departure. Id. at 29, 607 A.2d at 152.
In addition, the court commented that as long as the computation of the goodwill lost is commensurate with the actual goodwill gained by the departing attorney, withholding that amount
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from the member would not constitute a penalty and therefore not
contravene RPC 5.6. Id. at 30, 607 A.2d at 152.
With regard to the anti-raiding provision, the justice noted
that New Jersey courts had yet to confront the validity of agreements that precluded departing members from soliciting professional or paraprofessional staff. Id., 607 A.2d at 153. Justice
Garibaldi articulated, however, that the unrestricted practice of
law that RPC 5.6 was intended to protect included a lawyer's untrammeled ability to contact and interact with other lawyers. Id.
at 30-31, 607 A.2d at 153. Further, in the court's view, anti-raiding provisions also detract from the career mobility of parties not
privy to the contract and prevent departing lawyers from associating with those professionals and paraprofessionals whom they
think will provide the most efficient legal services to their clients.
Id. at 31-32, 607 A.2d at 153. The justice therefore concluded
that although the anti-raiding provision was not a direct prohibition on the practice of law, it constituted an indirect restriction
and likewise violated Rule 5.6. Id. at 32, 607 A.2d at 153-154.
The supreme court, finding the competitive-departure provisions unenforceable as against public policy, announced that the
remainder of the Agreement was nonetheless enforceable. Id. at
32-33, 607 A.2d at 154. Specifically, Justice Garibaldi reasoned
that the Agreement's overriding purpose was to compensate departing attorneys. Id. at 33, 607 A.2d at 154. Because this purpose could be attained if the offending provision was excised, the
court held that Jacob and Collier were entitled to the compensation awarded to attorneys leaving NMM on a non-competitive basis. Id. The justice maintained that public policy considerations
fully supported this conclusion. Id. at 34, 607 A.2d at 155. In
fact, the justice stated, enforcing the agreement would be the
only way to discourage firms from making restrictive covenants
and to encourage attorneys bound by their terms to contest their
validity. Id., 607 A.2d at 155.
Finally, the court refuted NMM's argument that equity
should preclude the plaintiffs from receiving the benefits of the
Agreement while being spared its burdens. Id. at 35-36, 607 A.2d
at 155. Although the court conceded that equity should intervene if the plaintiffs had drafted the Agreement, imposed its
terms on others, and then sought to escape its terms, the justice
noted that Jacob and Collier had not assumed such a position. Id.
at 36, 607 A.2d at 155. Moreover, the justice acknowledged that
the court's decision effectively provided Jacob and Collier with a
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windfall benefit. Id. at 35, 607 A.2d at 155. Justice Garibaldi,
however, emphasized that ifJacob and Collier were denied compensation, NMM would likewise receive a windfall by benefitting
from an agreement that was repugnant to public policy. Id. Indeed, the justice clarified, if the plaintiffs were not compensated
under the agreement, RPC 5.6 would be rendered powerless and
firms would subvert the rule without penalty. Id. at 35, 607 A.2d
at 155. Faced with a decision to award an undeserved benefit to
either the plaintiffs or NMM, the court, supported by policy considerations, posited that the public interest would be most effectively served by excising the competitive-departure provisions
and awarding Jacob and Collier the termination provided for
under the Agreement. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court commendably interpreted
RPC 5.6 as a Rule promulgated primarily to guard a client's freedom to retain counsel of choice. Treating clients as commodities
gravely compromises the fiducial nature of the attorney-client relationship and fosters animosity towards lawyers. Hopefully, the
court's decision will preserve the integrity of the legal profession
by elevating service over economic benefit. Only by protecting
an attorney's ability and motivation to continue representation
upon leaving a law firm can a client repose trust and confidence
in counsel. Lawyers should not be coerced into choosing between receiving an earned economic benefit or continuing an established relationship. The right to practice law includes the
right to capitalize on professional reputation, regardless of where
that reputation was developed.
The court's decision will undoubtedly have significant economic ramifications. Law firms, however, can easily tailor compensation agreements to protect their financial status without
unduly infringing upon an attorney's right to practice law. Attorneys receive specialized training in resolving complex legal
problems. Indeed, because the legal profession is governed by
ethical, not commercial standards, lawyers should be under a
duty to apply their knowledge in a manner that will uphold both
an attorney's right to practice and a client's right to choose representation.
Donna L. Salerno
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FIRST AMENDMENT-LIBEL-SUMMARY JUDGMENT Is APPROPRIATE AGAINST A PUBLIC-FIGURE PLAINTIFF ABSENT EviDENCE THAT WOULD, WITH CONVINCING CLARITY, LEAD A
JURY To CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLISHED FALSE
STATEMENTS WITH ACTUAL MALICE--Schwartz v. Worrall Publications, Inc., No. A-2770-91T5F, 1992 WL 195938 (N.J.
Super. App. Div., July 22, 1992).
The plaintiff, Lawrence Schwartz, was a former president of
the New Jersey School Boards Association (Association). 1992
WL 195938, at * 1. Schwartz, formerly a Belleville School Board
attorney, represented the Association when the State Commission of Investigation (SCI) probed losses incurred by the Association's insurance company. Schwartz personally was not under
any scrutiny, nor was he the subject of any SCI investigation.
On Thursday, March 29, 1990, the Belleville Post (Post)
printed an article, attributed to the authorship of staff writer
Chris Gatto, indicating that Schwartz was the target of a state investigation concerning the insurance controversy and alleged excessive legal fees. Schwartz's law firm demanded a retraction,
which did not appear until after Schwartz and the firm filed a defamation suit naming Worrall Publications, Inc. (Worrall), the
publisher of the Post, and Gatto as defendants.
Gatto decided to write the story after reading a front-page
Star Ledger piece that revealed aspects of Schwartz's hiring and
the amount of his fee. Id. at *2. The Star Ledger piece, however,
made no claim that Schwartz or his fees were under scrutiny by
the SCI. Gatto contacted Schwartz regarding his fees. He also
discussed the Star Ledger article with an Association spokesman
and, after verifying its accuracy, prepared a draft of the story for
publication in the Post. Gatto provided the draft to his editor,
Joseph Cammelieri, and immediately thereafter left for Washington, D.C. to begin work on another story.
Cammelieri, confused by Gatto's draft, rewrote the article to
conform to his erroneous interpretation that Schwartz was personally marked by the SCI investigation. Cammelieri had not
read the Star Ledger article, nor had he spoken to Gatto or read
Gatto's notes before completing the Post story for publication.
When Gatto saw the published article, he notified Cammelieri of
the inaccuracies. Cammelieri also heard from both the Association and Schwartz's law firm concerning the story's falsity. After
Schwartz's firm so demanded, Cammelieri composed a retraction

386

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:378

that was reviewed by Worrall's counsel but never published. Following the ultimate release of the SCI report, the Post finally issued a retraction without reference to Schwartz and his fees.
Schwartz and his law firm had by then already filed a lawsuit
claiming that they were damaged by the article, which they alleged "tortiously interfered with the firm's business advantages."
Id. at * 1. Both sides moved for summary judgment. Id. Worrall
moved on the grounds that the law firm was not the subject of the
allegedly defamatory article and that Schwartz was a public figure
who had not established actual malice. Id. Schwartz and his coplaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment seeking to
establish that the article's content was defamatory. Id. The New
Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County, agreed with
the plaintiffs, granting their motion for partial summary judgment and denying Worrall's motion. Id.
The motion judge concluded that the story was defamatory
on its face. Id. at *2. Thejudge found that the article besmirched
both Schwartz and his law firm, and, relying on Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), represented an extreme departure from any ordinary standards of investigation observed by responsible publishers. Id. at **2-3. In the opinion of the motion
judge, the article appeared as it did because its shock value would
help sell newspapers. Id. at *3. The judge was particularly perturbed by the newspaper's delay in printing a retraction, Cammelieri's failure to look for a source that would clear up his
misunderstanding of the original draft, impure connotations created by the reporting of actual facts out of context and the allegedly deliberate creation of a false conflict between Schwartz and
his former employer. Id. In deciding the motion, the judge did
not determine whether or not Schwartz was a public figure. Id. at
*2.
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed the Law Division's denial of Worrall's motion for
summary judgment. Id. at *7. Concluding that Schwartz was a
public figure, Judge Cohen, writing for the appellate panel, held
that Worrall was entitled to summary judgment on the ground
that Schwartz could not establish evidence that would demonstrate to a jury, with convincing clarity, that Worrall knew or
should have known that the article contained false statements. Id.
at *4, *6. The court deliberately avoided granting summary
judgment against Schwartz's law firm on the basis sought in the
defendants' motion-that the article did not concern or mention
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the firm. Id. at *6. Instead, Judge Cohen declared that the
court's holding extended to the claims brought by the law firm
because Schwartz's public figure status, under the facts of the
case, extended to the firm. Id.
The court began its analysis by proclaiming Schwartz a public figure. Id. at *3. Accordingly, Judge Cohen applied the standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), and announced that Schwartz must substantiate with convincing clarity that the Post printed the false statements with "actual malice," which entails the defendant's knowledge of or
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the published statements. Id. at *4. Having noted that the motion judge did not
address the issue of whether Schwartz was a public official or figure, Judge Cohen instructed courts, in future instances, to decide
this threshold question at the outset of a defamation action. Id. at
*3. In the matter at hand, the appellate court pointed to
Schwartz's long-standing visibility as one-time Association president and counsel, school district attorney and counsel to numerous individual school systems. Id. Given his prominent role in
matters of public interest, the court found, Schwartz had voluntarily accepted comment and attention and thereby fit the profile of
a public figure. Id.
The court next explained the applicable tests for summary
judgment in defamation actions. See id. at *4. A public figure
plaintiff, the court conveyed, must provide more than mere evidence of actual malice. Id. at *4. Judge Cohen stated that to survive a summary judgment motion, a public figure plaintiff must
show that a reasonable jury could find actual malice under the
heightened standard of proof enunciated in New York Times-by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. The criteria to be applied by
the motion judge in this regard, the court informed, are similar
to those considered when determining a directed verdict. Id. The
court concluded, having independently reviewed the entire record, that Schwartz's proofs failed to establish that a reasonable
jury could decide by clear and convincing evidence that the Post
published the story with actual malice. Id.
While noting the difficulty in applying summary judgment
standards where a state of mind-such as the concept of actual
malice-is at issue, Judge Cohen pointed to Constitutional considerations that figure prominently in the policy advocating the
use of summary judgment in libel actions. Id. at *6. The court
explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court considered mo-
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tions for summary judgment in this context appropriate because
they "discourag[ed] frivolous defamation actions." Id. (quoting
Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 156, 516
A.2d 220 (1986)).
The court made clear that the traditional summary judgment
test-whether there is a genuine issue of material fact-would
apply in a common-law case in which the defendant invoked a
common-law privilege, such as the privilege of fair comment, as a
defense. Id. at *4. In such a case, Judge Cohen revealed, New
York Times would not control. In the instant matter, however, the
court explained that Schwartz's public figure status raised actual
malice as a constitutional concept and, therefore, demanded application of the New York Times standard. Id.
In arriving at the determination that a reasonable jury could
not be clearly and convincingly persuaded to find actual malice,
the court found a lack of evidence that any agent of Worrall knew
the story contained falsehoods. Id. While Worrall may have been
irresponsible, uncaring-even negligent-the court expressed
that Worrall's behavior nevertheless did not evince a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at *5. The court explained that the
touchstone for reckless disregard was a strong perception of a
statement's falsity or grave doubts of the veracity of a publication. Id. at *4 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)). The unprofessional editing of the article, the court contended, did not satisfy this recognized criterion. Id. at *5. Schwartz failed to shed any doubt on
the explanation that Cammelieri's changing the meaning of the
story was inadvertent, stated Judge Cohen. Id. Further, the court
found no agenda, on the part of Worrall and Cammelieri, that
would have lead them to defame Schwartz and lie about it afterwards. Id.
Additionally, Judge Cohen maintained that the Law Division's emphasis on the newspaper's deviation from professional
standards was misplaced because that benchmark-though proposed by four justices in Curtis Publishing-was never adopted by
a single majority of the United States Supreme Court. Id. Carelessness, the court indicated, was not enough to constitute actual
malice. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & PrintingLtd., 89
N.J. 451, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982)).
Turning to the relevance of the delay in printing a retraction, the court observed that a delay is generally not without
some significance but, in this case, the delay had less importance
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than Schwartz argued. Id. The delay, the court pronounced, did
little to reveal anything about Cammelieri's state of mind at the
time he published the article. Id. Cautioning against too much
judicial reliance on circumstantial proof such as motive evidence,
Judge Cohen nevertheless found no indication that Worrall's delay in printing a retraction was deliberately engineered to extend
the effect of the allegedly false statements. Id. at *6. Even assuming that Worrall and the company pursued some hidden agenda,
merely acting to further political or financial motives, the court
instructed, is not enough to support a finding of actual malice.
The court also determined that the motion judge was wrong
to infer defamation from undisputed facts. Id. A defamatory
meaning, Judge Cohen stated, could not be wrung from those
statements published about Schwartz in the Post that were true.
Id.
Accordingly, the court reversed the motion judge's denial of
Worrall's motion for summary judgment, vacated the judge's order granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consonant with its
determination. Id. at *7.
In Schwartz v. Worrall, the Appellate Division correctly identified the plaintiff as a public figure and applied the appropriate
precedent. Unfortunately, the decision will not give the public
much confidence that the law favors truth over falsity. This
shortcoming, however, lies not with the court, but with the status
of libel law. While all libel is actionable per se, regardless of
whether the plaintiff has suffered special harm, the likelihood of
success for a public figure is minuscule. Even if, as here, the defendant's shoddy practices bear out an indifference to the truth, a
public figure loses on libel unless he can show, with convincing
clarity, actual malice on the part of the defendant.
Because actual malice by clear and convincing evidence is
the standard to be applied at trial, it is also the standard the
judge must apply in deciding a summary judgment motion. To
determine whether a claim is Constitutionally sufficient, the
judge must resolve not merely that a reasonable jury could find
actual malice, but that actual malice is shown with convincing
clarity. Therefore, the law requires the judge to invade the province of the jury by deciding what the jury must decide-whether
it has found the evidence to be clear and convincing.
While the court prudently alluded to the difficulty in deciding libel cases on summary judgment, Judge Cohen nevertheless
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cited with approval the policy considerations that encourage the
use of summary judgment in this realm. See id. at *6. The court
failed to recognize, however, that allowing a libel case to be decided on summary judgment demands that the judge get into the
minds of the jury. This should not be permitted. If a plaintiff
adduces evidence that directly or inferentially provides the necessary elements to establish a libel action, then the defendant's
summary judgment motion must fail without regard to the plaintiff's burden of proof. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The United States Supreme Court devised the actual malice
standard for libel claims to keep secure the First Amendment and
to protect vital and dynamic reporting. It is doubtful, however,
that newspapers and other media need the level of protection to
which they are now entitled. If reasonable jurors could conclude
that a statement was libelous, then the case should go to the jury.
This would chill free expression only to the extent that a media
defendant may be held liable if its sloppy editorial policy evinces
a reckless disregard for the truth. The public, furthermore,
would benefit from any additional caution such a state of affairs
might require of the press because the result would enhance the
reliability of the material reported.
Richard A. Gantner

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-JUDICIAL ADJU-

DICATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE BETWEEN THEOLOGICAL

SEMINARY AND ITS EMPLOYEE

Is

BARRED BY THE FREE EXER-

CISE CLAUSE WHEN THE EMPLOYEE PERFORMS MINISTERIAL

FUNCTIONS-Alicea v.

New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 128
N.J. 303, 608 A.2d 218 (1992).
In 1980, Reverend Benjamin Alicea (Alicea) was appointed
to direct the New Brunswick Theological Seminary's (NBTS) Urban Studies Program. 128 NJ. at 308, 608 A.2d at 220. At the
expiration of Alicea's three-year term, the Reverend Howard
Hageman (Hageman), who was then NBTS's president, offered
Alicea a one year position as assistant professor at NBTS. Alicea
accepted the position to NBTS's faculty.
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In the year following Alicea's appointment to assistant professor, a dispute developed concerning the details of Hageman's
offer, specifically, whether Alicea was entitled to tenure-track status. After settlement efforts failed, Alicea resigned and filed suit,
alleging constructive discharge and resignation under duress. Id.
at 309, 608 A.2d at 221. Alicea contended that in exchange for
accepting a faculty position at NBTS and foregoing employment
opportunities at the San Francisco Theological Seminary, Hageman promised to place Alicea on tenure-track status. Alicea asserted that Hageman had assured him tenure once his doctoral
studies were completed.
In response, NBTS relied on a provision in the Church's
Board of Theological Education (BTE) bylaws, which authorized
the NBTS President to approve only one-year appointments, to
characterize Alicea's employment as non-tenure-track and temporary. Id., 608 A.2d at 220. Alicea, conceding that his appointment was not approved by means of the appropriate procedure,
instead maintained that Hageman had apparent authority to
grant tenure status. Id., 608 A.2d at 221.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, refused to exercise jurisdiction over what it characterized as a religious dispute, and granted NBTS's summary judgment motion. Id.
Stating that the case was void of doctrinal issues, the New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment. Id. The appellate court balanced the state's
interest in resolving contract disputes against a religious institution's right to be free from government control under the First
Amendment. Id. The appellate court perceived that because resolution of the dispute required extensive analysis into the
church's customs and practices, such scrutiny would constitute
excessive government entanglement and dismissal was therefore
appropriate. Id. at 310, 608 A.2d at 221. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted Alicea's request for certification and affirmed. Id. at 307, 608 A.2d at 219.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Clifford began the
analysis highlighting the distinction between the Free Exercise
Clause in the First Amendment, asserted by the defendant in the
companion case of Welter v. Seton Hall University, and unconstitutional regulatory entanglement, upon which the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, based its judgment in the
instant case. Id. at 311, 608 A.2d at 221-22. Justice Clifford then
stated, however, that the court would not reach the question of
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impermissible entanglement because a violation of NBTS's right
to freely exercise its religious beliefs was readily apparent. Id.,
608 A.2d at 222.
Turning to the applicable First Amendment jurisprudence,
the justice conceded Alicea's point that the judiciary must refrain
from decisions regarding church doctrine, but was not barred in
areas of church polity. Id. Nonetheless, the justice observed the
United States Supreme Court admonition against adjudicating
questions of ecclesiastical doctrine or polity when possible. Id.
(citations omitted). Justice Clifford noted that deference should
normally be given to church authority on such questions. Id. (citations omitted). In further support of the need for judicial abstinence, the court looked to its own precedent. Id. The court's
prior decisions illustrated that First Amendment infringement
could occur as a result of judicial intervention into an institution's selection of employees whose positions were critical to the
direction of the faithful. Id.
The justice then skirted Alicea's contention that because
NBTS was incorporated and given the power to create legally enforceable contracts under New Jersey statutes, it should not be
permitted to avoid contract obligations by claiming constitutional immunity. Id. at 311-12, 608 A.2d at 222.
Justice Clifford then reiterated the court's refusal to maintain an absolute prohibition against adjudication of disputes between religious leaders or institutions and their employees. Id. at
312, 608 A.2d at 222. Nevertheless, the justice recognized a disinclination to intervene because of the likelihood that such scrutiny would transgress the First Amendment. Id. (citations
omitted). Such abstinence, the justice stated, is called for given
that many cases raised doctrinal issues and, therefore, were not
the province of the court. Id. By illustration, the justice observed
that those whom the church employed to teach its values directly
affected the church's successful existence. Id. Thus, the court
noted that in these cases, unless the parties had previously
agreed to waive their free-exercise rights and unless incidents of
litigation would not disrupt an institution's administration,
courts cannot interfere in the employment relationship. Id. at
312-13, 608 A.2d at 222. (citations omitted)
The court majority then preceded to review factors relevant
to its determination of whether adjudication of employment disputes would conflict with the First Amendment. Id. at 313, 608
A.2d at 223. Justice Clifford explained that factors such as the
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employee's ministerial role, the doctrinal nature of the dispute,
and the practical effects of applying legal principle to the controversy all mandate attention when assessing the merits of adjudication. Id. (citations omitted). The justice next noted that to
assess the extent of doctrine or polity implicated in the dispute,
factors such as the employee's function, the clarity of contractual
clauses governing the employee's function and the opposing
side's justifications for its conduct all must weigh in the resolution of this inquiry. Id.
Justice Clifford then opined that when neither regulatory entanglement, the ministerial function performed by the employee,
nor the doctrinal aspects of the dispute require abstention,
courts must effectuate the intent of individuals seeking enforcement. Id. The justice emphasized that express agreements or implied promises should be enforced to comport with religious
doctrine if non-compliance or compliance with such agreements
could be determined by utilizing neutral legal principles. Id. The
majority further declared that contractual waivers of rights to act
according to or under religious beliefs should also be enforced
so long as judicial enforcement does not impermissibly entangle
church and state. Id. at 313-14, 608 A.2d at 223. The court next
highlighted factors to consider when determining the intent of
the parties, including contractual text or employment manuals,
an analysis of whether employee duties encompassed supervising
impressionable students, and the employee's function. Id.
The court then distinguished the factual background of the
companion case, Welter v. Seton Hall University, with Alicea's dispute. Id. The justice emphasized that in Welter the plaintiffs did
not perform ministerial functions and doctrinal issues were not
substantial. Id. In contrast, Justice Clifford stressed that Alicea,
as associate professor at NBTS, performed ministerial functions.
Id. The justice concluded that adjudication would implicate
church polity and thus declared that the First Amendment mandated abstention. Id. Reviewing the facts, the court asserted that
Alicea's functions, as well as NBTS' requirement that nonChurch ordained professors acknowledge the Church's foundational tenets, reinforced its decision. Id. at 315, 608 A.2d at 22324. The justice reasoned that these factors demonstrated that
such employee responsibility implicated not only issues of polity
but also issues of church doctrine. Id.
Finally, Justice Clifford clarified and distinguished previous
supreme court decisions, which Alicea interpreted as mandating,
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at minimum, that the court remand the controversy to the religious body for adjudication. Id. at 35-16, 608 A.2d at 224-25.
The justice stressed that parties in Elmora Hebrew Center v. Fishman
were held to have consented to proceedings in front of a religious tribunal. Id. at 316, 608 A.2d at 224. Justice Clifford thus
emphasized that Fishman did not require forced arbitration of
religious controversies. Id. at 316, 608 A.2d at 224. The justice
similarly noted that in Baugh v. Thomas, attorneys for both parties
consented to the procedures enforced. Id. at 317, 608 A.2d at
224. Determining not to remand Alicea's dispute to the seminary's tribunal, the court concluded that the court could not enforce vague, optional grievance procedures outlined in NBTS's
employment manual. Id.
In Alicea, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the passive role which the judiciary must take when confronted by litigation containing religious overtones. Indeed, the court noted
distinctions between impermissible entanglement and a religious
institution's freedom to exercise its beliefs, both mandated by the
First Amendment. Because these ideals are entrenched within
our Constitution and societal mores, it should be no surprise that
the supreme court refused to exercise jurisdiction in this particular matter.
Lincoln Terzian

SECURITIES-NOTICE

PROVISIONs-NOTICE

TERM IN PROJECT NOTES

Is

By

PUBLICATION

BINDING ON PURCHASERS DUE

To

UNIQUE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ATTENDANT To INVESTMENT

SECURITIES-Rudbart v. No. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commis-

sion, 127 N.J. 344, 605 A.2d 681 (1992).
On June 15, 1984, the North Jersey District Water Commission (Commission) issued seventy-five million dollars in project
notes to fund construction of a new public water system. 127 N.J.
at 348-49, 605 A.2d at 683. The notes yielded seven and seveneighths percent per annum tax-free, with interest payments distributed eachJune 15th and December 15th. Id. at 349, 605 A.2d
at 683. Although the fixed maturity date for the notes was June
15, 1987, the notes were subject to earlier redemption at the
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Commission's option. By the terms of the notes and the offering
statement, early redemption would be preceded by thirty days
published notice in newspapers in Newark, New Jersey and New
York City, New York.
The Commission resolved to redeem the notes before the
original maturity date, and entered an escrow agreement with
First Fidelity Bank, N.A. (Fidelity). Id., 605 A.2d at 683-84. The
Commission agreed to deposit funds with Fidelity for redemption of the notes, with Fidelity paying redeeming noteholders
principal along with interest up to the new redemption date, June
23, 1986.
Fidelity published the requisite notice of early redemption in
the May 23 and June 9, 1986, issues of the New York Times, the
Newark Star-Ledger and the Wall Street Journal. Id. at 350, 605
A.2d at 684. Although noteholders received regular interest payments by mail on June 15, 1986, the mailings failed to mention
the imminent redemption date.
On December 15, 1986, approximately ten million dollars of
the notes were still outstanding. Despite a request by the Commission, Fidelity refused to deposit the escrow money in an interest-bearing account. Subsequently, several noteholders inquired
about delinquent interest payments, and in early 1987, Fidelity
mailed notice of the bygone redemption date to holders of the
unredeemed notes. Payment on late-redeemed notes included
the redemption price and interest fromJune 15 to June 23, 1986,
the early redemption date.
In February and April 1987, plaintiffs filed separate complaints, which were consolidated for trial and which advanced
various theories in support of their demands for interest from the
published call date to the date of actual redemption. Id. Finding
the notice by publication legally sufficient, the trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. at 351, 605 A.2d
at 684.
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that because purchasers had no
power to negotiate terms, the notes were paradigmatic contracts
of adhesion. Id. Embracing this theory, the appellate division
ruled that the notice provision was inadequate, and reversed. Id.
at 351-52, 605 A.2d at 685. The New Jersey Supreme Court
granted certification, and held that although the notes were contracts of adhesion, the notice by publication provision was not so
inequitable as to warrant judicial intervention. Id. at 359, 605
A.2d at 688.
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In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court began by observing that under general contract law principles, the terms of the
notes would be binding. Id. at 352, 605 A.2d at 685. Conversely,
the court declared that if an agreement is adjudged a contract of
adhesion, with unilaterally-fixed terms, it may be invalidated as a
matter of policy. Id. at 353-54, 605 A.2d at 685. The court cited
several important factors in this policy equation, including the
relative bargaining positions of the parties, the subject matter of
the agreement, the magnitude of economic coercion on the
purchasing party, and the general public interests implicated. Id.
at 356, 605 A.2d at 687. Reviewing the notes in light of these
considerations, the court found insufficient justification for invalidating the notice by publication provision. Id.
The court averred that three primary considerations buttressed this conclusion. Id. As an initial matter, the court declared, investors were not compelled to buy the project notes,
but were free to choose from a vast array of investment offerings,
with a variety of terms. Id. Because alternative investments were
available, the court reasoned, the note purchasers were not compelled by monopolistic market conditions, and did not suffer
from an unequal bargaining position. Id. Thus, the court declared, the most forceful reasons for invalidating the challenged
terms in a contract of adhesion are inapposite in an open, competitive securities market. Id.
Additionally, the court pronounced, enforcing the terms of
publicly offered securities promotes rather than frustrates significant public policy considerations. Id. at 357, 605 A.2d at 687-88.
The court observed that in New Jersey, purchasers of securities
are charged with notice of the terms printed on the initial transaction statement or on the certificate. Id. at 357-58, 605 A.2d at
688 (quoting U.C.C. § 802 cmt. 1. (1977)). Enforcing these
terms, the court stated, promotes stability and confidence in the
securities market, whereas permitting judicial scrutiny of the
terms' fairness would impair the negotiability of the securities, in
contravention of the legislature's intent. Id. Finally, the court
pointed to the full disclosure requirements of state and federal
securities laws, and declared that these regulations provided the
proper touchstone for judging the fairness of the instruments. Id.
at 358-59, 605 A.2d at 688.
Against this tableau, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the notice provision in the project notes was not so unfair as
to warrant judicial intervention. Id. at 359, 605 A.2d at 688. Cit-
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ing the special policy factors accompanying securities offerings,
the court concluded that although the challenged securities were
by definition contracts of adhesion, purchasers of the notes were
nonetheless bound by the notice by publication provision. Id. at
361, 605 A.2d at 689.
Notwithstanding the refusal to invalidate the challenged notice provision, the court recognized the profound inequity of permitting Fidelity to notify only select investors of the impending
redemption date, while perhaps earning profits on the unclaimed
escrow funds. Id., 605 A.2d at 689-90. The court declared that
because Fidelity served as an indenture trustee or escrow agent
for the noteholders, constructive trust principles required the return of at least a portion of any profits realized by Fidelity. Id. at
361-62, 605 A.2d at 690. Accordingly, the court remanded the
matter for a determination of the profits earned by Fidelity and
appropriate re-allocation of those funds. Id. at 367-68, 605 A.2d
at 692-93.
Concurring in the result and dissenting in part, Judge Petrella, temporarily assigned, asserted that although the terms of
an investment security are not unconscionable, judicial intrusion
may sometimes be justified. Id. at 368, 605 A.2d at 693 (Petrella,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Petrella rejected the majority's contention that an absence of economic
compulsion on the purchaser was dispositive of the fairness inquiry, and asserted that investment securities should receive the
same scrutiny as any other contract of adhesion. Id. at 369, 605
A.2d at 693-94 (Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Judge Petrella was also troubled that Fidelity had served in
multiple capacities with regard to the notes, including underwriter, indenture trustee, and escrow agent, Id. at 375, 605 A.2d
at 697 (Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
that Fidelity had provided note-holding customers of its investment department notice by mail or telephone prior to the early
redemption date. Id. at 373, 605 A.2d at 696 (PetrellaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although Fidelity maintained that a "Chinese wall" separated the bank's investment
department from the redemption executing trust department,
Judge Petrella was unpersuaded, and declared that the selective
notification provided to First Fidelity customers represented a
lack of fair dealing approaching bad faith. Id. at 377, 605 A.2d at
697 (Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
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judge maintained that the bank should not be permitted to avoid
duties by hiding behind a fabricated "Chinese Wall," only to
emerge and reap the benefit of its special position. Id., 605 A.2d
at 697-98 (Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Concluding that evenhanded treatment should be mandated,
Judge Petrella concurred in the outcome of the main opinion,
based primarily on the reasoning set forth by the appellate division. Id. at 379-80, 605 A.2d at 699 (citing Rudbart v. Water Supply
Comm'n, 238 N.J. Super. 41, 568 A.2d 1213 (App. Div. 1990))
(Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Gaulkin, temporarily assigned, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, wrote separately to emphasize the apparent
inconsistency of the majority's reasoning. Id. at 380, 605 A.2d at
699 (Gaulkin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Part
III of the main opinion, Judge Gaulkin observed, bound plaintiffs
to the terms of the project notes on the premise that the terms
were not so unfair as to warrant judicial intervention. Id. The
judge stated that in Part IV, the court nonetheless provided
plaintiffs with the relief sought - i.e., post-redemption date interest - based on the overwhelming inequity of the situation. Id.
Judge Gaulkin declared that by awarding interest after the published redemption date, the court altered the parties' contract. Id.
at 381, 605 A.2d at 699 (Gaulkin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Further, Judge Gaulkin questioned the majority's decision to
impose a constructive trust based on First Fidelity's selective notification of customers. Id., 605 A.2d at 699-700 (Gaulkin,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Gaulkin declared
that because the court had failed to demonstrate that either the
investment department or the trust department violated any obligations, Fidelity's behavior could not be found inequitable. Id.,
605 A.2d at 700 (Gaulkin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In conclusion, Judge Gaulkin stressed that the court's incongruous decision was likely to breed uncertainty regarding the
obligations of parties in securities transactions. Id. at 381-82, 605
A.2d at 700 (Gaulkin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
In dissent, Justice Clifford opined that the plurality created
an unnecessary paradox by reversing the appellate division holding premised on the conclusion that the notes were contracts of
adhesion, only to determine that the notes were in fact contracts
of adhesion. Id. at 382, 605 A.2d at 700 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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Turning to the notice provision, Justice Clifford professed that
the notice by publication term in the notes was not sufficiently
unfair to warrant judicial intrusion. Id. at 382-383, 605 A.2d at
700 (Clifford, J., dissenting). In conclusion, Justice Clifford
agreed with Judge Gaulkin that plaintiffs were owed no post-redemption interest. Id. at 383, 605 A.2d at 700 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting).
In Rudbart v. Water Supply Comm 'n, the New Jersey Supreme
Court grappled with the competing concerns of strict enforceability of contract terms and overarching equitable principles,
and crafted a result that rests on tenuous middle ground. After
aligning with the policies mandating enforcement of the notes'
terms, the majority refused to put the round peg in the round
hole and instead forged a remedy that enervates those terms. By
imposing a constructive trust on funds retained by Fidelity, and
awarding late-redeeming noteholders what amounts to post-redemption interest, the court granted delinquent noteholders a
windfall. Despite the fact that purchasers bargained away the
right to notice by mail, perhaps in exchange for a slightly higher
return on their investments, the court, nettled by a perceived inequity, reinstated that right at Fidelity's expense.
Moreover, the court failed to acknowledge that Fidelity's selective notification of noteholders did not deprive non-customers
of any right. If the playing field was slanted, it was only because
customers of Fidelity's investment department got more than
they were owed, not that non-customers got less.
Nonetheless, the Rudbart holding reflects the court's commitment to deterring sharp business practices and other inequitable conduct, particularly in situations that are ripe for abuse.
Although Fidelity asserted that a "Chinese wall" separated the
investment and trust departments, it was, unavoidably, a single
entity

-

the bank

-

that served as both investment counselor

and trustee. The potential for overreaching under these circumstances is disturbing, particularly due to the adverse impact on
the confidence of the investing public. Ultimately, however,
Rudbart must be moored closely to the specific facts of the case to
ensure that judicial fairness review does not supplant the express
terms in securities offerings.
Scott C. Shelley
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-JUDICIAL REVIEW By STATE COURT Is APPROPRIATE WHEN SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTRACT BETWEEN RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION AND
CLERIC IS SECULAR IN NATURE-Welter v. Seton Hall University,

128 N.J. 279 (1992).
In 1980, plaintiffs Marilyn and Carolyn Welter (the Welters),
both Roman Catholic nuns of the Ursuline Order, each entered
into one year probationary teaching contracts with Seton Hall
University (the University). 128 N.J. at 285. The contracts,
which contained no religious provisions, were originally entered
into without Ursuline permission. Id. at 285-86. Both employment agreements contained provisions mandating a terminal one
year contract and written notice before termination could take
place. Id. at 287.
By their third year of employment, the Welters' academic
credentials came into question. Id. at 286. Citing the fact that the
Welters had become a "disruptive" presence among the faculty,
the University determined that termination was appropriate. Id.
While the University had contemplated providing written notice
and offering a terminal one year contract in accordance with the
employment agreements, it instead decided that immediate termination would be more favorable. Id. at 287. In the course of
seeking a proper method of terminating the Welters without
breaching the employment agreements, the University discovered that Ursuline supervisors did not, in fact, advocate the
Welters' continued employment with the school. Id. at 287.
Based on this information and relying on Canon Law provisions
prohibiting, among other things, "accepting duties and offices
outside the institute without the permission of the legitimate superior," the University terminated the Welters without complying with the terms of the employment agreement. Id. at 287-88.
The Welters charged that the University was attempting to convert the matter into one based upon religious doctrine as opposed to law. Id. at 288.
The Welters commenced suit in the New Jersey Superior
Court, Law Division, seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 289. A jury ultimately found that the University
had breached both contracts and awarded each plaintiff $45,000
in compensatory damages. Id. The New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, reversed and remanded the case for a further
trial. Id. The appellate court concluded that a jury must deter-
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mine whether the University's decision to terminate was truly
based on the belief that it would be violating Canon Law by employing the Welters without Ursuline permission, or conversely,
whether it was made to achieve non-religious goals. Id. at 290.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
required civil judicial abstention when a case, by implication,
passes judgment on religious matters. Id.
Justice Clifford, writing for an unanimous court, began his
discussion by summarizing Justice Handler's opinion in Elmora
Hebrew Center v. Fisman, 125 N.J. 404 (1991). Id. at 292. Quoting
Justice Handler, Justice Clifford explained that while the First
Amendment does preclude civil courts from passing on questions
of religious or ecclesiastical polity, "the courthouse door remains
open" to religious institutions for the adjudication of secular
legal issues despite the fact that those rights are based on religious affiliations. Id. Consequently, the justice criticized the Appellate Division for failing to recognize the critical difference
between employees of religious institutions whose obligation includes spreading their faith and those who concentrate exclusively on secular duties. Id. at 293. Justice Clifford articulated
that civil courts should abstain from hearing a case only when the
underlying conflict turns on religious polity or doctrine, and emphasized that an individual's status as a cleric within a sectarian
institution alone should not form the basis for judicial abstention. Id. at 294. To do otherwise, the court warned, would preclude any cleric employed by a religious institution from ever
bringing a civil action against that institution. Id.
Turning to the federal system for guidance, Justice Clifford
noted that Congress has attempted to distinguish between those
employment disputes involving religious institutions that should
be adjudicated and those that should not. Id. In particular, the
court discussed the federal courts' use of the "ministerial-function" test. Id. This test, Justice Clifford elucidated, states that the
First Amendment forbids judicial resolution by a civil court when
an employee's duties transform that employee into a liaison between a religion and its followers, or when the employee's primary functions include "teaching, spreading the faith, church
governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship

....

"

Id. at 295

(quoting Rayburn v. General Conference, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171-72
(4th Cir. 1985)). The court noted that past application of the
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ministerial-function test had been based on the sound proposition that judicial interference with a religious employer's right to
choose who may spread the faith (or train others to do so) impermissibly entangled the court in matters of religious polity. Id.
The court agreed that judicial abstinence is required when the
employee is required to perform ministerial functions as part of
their employment duties. Id. Indeed, the court opined that a limitation on whom a religious institution may consider to propagate
the faith greatly incurs the free exercise of religion. Id. The court
added that religious institutions may "bargain away" their right
to unimpeded discretion in employment matters by allowing civil
judicial review through a waiver in the employment contract. Id.
at 296.
Having laid this groundwork, Justice Clifford next addressed
the relevant factors in determining whether an employment dispute implicates religious issues. Id. at 296-97. The justice espoused that a court should scrutinize the circumstances
surrounding the origination of the employment agreement. Id. at
297. More specifically, the justice expostulated that a court
should ascertain whether the parties intended for doctrinal matters to control the parties contractual interests. Id. If such intent
was present, the justice opined that religious authorities, not civil
courts, must determine the issue. Id. The court set forth several
factors to be used in ascertaining the parties' intent, including
the text of the employment contract, the parties' actions and the
nature of employment duties as determined through application
of the ministerial function test. Id. The justice stated that a lack
of ministerial functions performed by the employee strongly implicated civil judicial accessibility and indicated that the parties to
the employment contract could not have reasonably contemplated that the agreement would incorporate religious strictures.
Id. Conversely, Justice Clifford noted that civil courts should entertain suits by employees who did perform ministerial functions
if the parties indicated in the employment contract that secular
courts would have jurisdiction or if the religious institution
waives its right to settle the dispute. Id.
The court next examined whether the Welters performed
ministerial functions as part of their employment duties or, in the
alternative, if the parties reasonably should have believed that
the employment contract implicated Roman Catholic Canon
Law. Id. at 298. The court concluded that the Welters performed
no ministerial duties for the University. Id. To support this deci-
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sion, Justice Clifford cited various federal opinions stating that
the function of the position, not the ordination, was the dispositive factor in determining if ministerial functions were indeed
performed. Id. The court emphasized that the Welters' positions
with the University did not involve religious matters, and that the
Welters never served as conduits between the Roman Catholic
Church and Catholic students. Id. at 299. Indeed, the court
stressed that the Welters were terminated based solely on secular
considerations. Id.
The court likewise failed to find that the Welters believed,
nor reasonably should have believed, that Canon Law would displace the procedural safeguards of the parties' contract. Id. To
support this assertion, the court pointed to the purely secular nature of the Welters' employment obligation, the lack of religious
connotation surrounding the employment contract and the fact
that the University had hired the Welters for their computer science skills and not because they were clerics. Id. at 300-01.
Based on these factors and the determination that the
Welters' duties were not ministerial in nature, the court determined that a civil court was not barred from adjudicating the
matter. Id. at 300. The court added that neither the sincerity nor
the correctness of the University's interpretation of Roman Catholic Canon Law infliienced the resolution of the dispute because
neither was reflected in the parties' employment agreement. Id.
at 300-01. Justice Clifford opined that while the genuineness of a
religious institution's beliefs may be appurtenant to a civil court's
decision whether to allow a First Amendment-based exemption
from involuntary and neutral government regulations, it rarely
disposes of a Free Exercise attack on voluntarily-assumed contractual obligations. Id. at 301.
The court also noted that this case differed from previous
cases in which individuals challenged their deprivation of a particular status within a religious institution. Id. Justice Clifford explained that civil courts were precluded from entertaining these
challenges because they were primarily sectarian in nature, and
that any deprivation of secular rights was merely incidental. Id. at
300. Conversely, the justice espoused that civil courts were not
precluded from entertaining a matter when sectarian interests
are inconsequential. Id. at 301. Finally, the court noted that absent a specific clause incorporating religious doctrine as a means
of resolving disputes regarding the employment contract, the
parties would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that resort to reli-
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gious doctrine was implied, especially when the employee's duties did not include ministerial tasks. Id. at 302.
In Welter, the court effectively protected the rights of contracting parties while affording due deference to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. While entanglement
between church and state is undoubtedly intolerable, a contract
that does not implicate religion or religious issues should not be
made exempt from civil judicial review. Indeed, the mere fact
that a religious institution enters into an agreement regarding
non-religious matters with a cleric as opposed to a lay person
clearly should not mandate civil judicial abstention. For example, assume that a cleric and a lay teacher are both responsible
for the same academic duties under identical non-religious employment contracts and are each subsequently terminated for the
same reason. Using the University's position, the lay teacher
would be free to pursue civil remedies in state court while the
cleric would be obliged to adjudicate his or her complaint under
religious law - a result that undoubtedly yields an unfair advantage to the institution.
The court rendered due regard to the Free Exercise Clause
by articulating that civil judicial abstention would have been appropriate if the contract involved religious polity or if the
Welters' duties were religious in nature. Id. at 295. The court
appropriately noted that neither scenario was present. Id. at 300.
By affirming the state court award, the New Jersey Supreme
Court competently communicated that the Free Exercise Clause
was not intended as a safe haven for religious institutions when
they breach wholly secular agreements.
CarmenJ. DiMaria

EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-TESTIMONY OF EPIDEMIOLOGIST Is ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION-Landrigan v. Celotex Corporation, 127 NJ. 404, 605

A.2d 1079 (1992).
Thomas Landrigan (plaintiff or Landrigan) used insulation
containing asbestos from 1956 until 1972, during his employment at the Bayonne Terminal Warehouse. 127 N.J. at 410, 605
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A.2d at 1082. The insulation was allegedly supplied by defendants, Owen-Corning Fiberglass Corporation and Owens Illinois,
Inc. Id. In December of 1981, a medical exam revealed that Landrigan suffered from colon cancer, from which he subsequently
died in December of 1982. Id. The plaintiff's wife filed a wrongful death and survivorship suit against defendants, alleging that
exposure to defendants' asbestos caused her husband's death. Id.
Before trial, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division,
ordered the plaintiff to choose between trying her claim under a
strict-liability theory or a combined strict liability and negligence
theory. Id. The court warned that if plaintiffs proceeded under
the combined theory, the defendants could assert the "state-ofthe-art defense". Id. (citing Bershada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982)). Accordingly, the plaintiff
elected to try the case on a theory of strict liability, thereby barring the defendants from utilizing the state-of-the-art defense. Id.
Plaintiffs were thereafter disallowed from recovering under a theory of negligence. Id.
The trial court also held a pre-trial Evidence Rule 8 hearing
to determine whether Doctor Wagoner (Wagoner), one of the
plaintiff's experts, was qualified to testify as to the cause of plaintiff's colon cancer. Id. at 411, 605 A.2d at 1082-83. The trial
court determined that Wagoner was not qualified to testify to the
cause of plaintiff's cancer, because Wagoner was an epidemiologist, not a physician. Id., 605 A.2d at 1083. The court, however,
allowed Wagoner to address epidemiological studies and methods that suggested a statistical correlation between colon cancer
and exposure to asbestos. Id.
In addition, plaintiffs relied on the testimony of Doctor
Sokolowski (Sokolowski), a certified internal and pulmonary
medical physician. Id. at 410, 605 A.2d at 1082. Sokolowski
based his conclusion that defendants' asbestos caused plaintiff's
death on a review of the plaintiff's medical history, a survey of
Wagoner's epidemiological findings and the absence of other
cancer causing agents. Id. at 411, 605 A.2d at 1082. Defending
his reliance on Wagoner's research, Sokolowski explained that
medical doctors often base their conclusions on such studies. Id.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the trial court
granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Id., 605 A.2d
at 1083. The court reasoned that because Wagoner was an epidemiologist who had never treated cancer patients, his testimony
regarding the cause of plaintiff's death was not persuasive. Id. at
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412, 605 A.2d at 1083. Furthermore, the court explained that,
although Sokolowski was a medical doctor, his testimony regarding plaintiff's death was equally unpersuasive because his opinion was based on Wagoner's findings. Id. Affirming the trial
court's decision, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division opined that neither Sokolowski nor Wagoner was qualified
to assist the trier of fact in understanding either the evidence or
facts in issue. Id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification to
examine three separate issues. Id. First, the court examined
whether an epidemiologist is qualified to testify regarding a
plaintiff's cause of death. Id. Next, the court queried whether a
medical doctor, who bases his determination of causation on epidemiological studies, is a valid expert witness. Id. Finally, the
court discussed whether the trial court had erroneously compelled the plaintiff to choose between asserting her claims under
the theory of strict liability or a combination of strict liability and
negligence. Id. at 423, 605 A.2d at 1089.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pollock first recognized that it is necessary to balance the need for expert testimony
with the requirements for admitting such testimony, pursuant to
Evidence Rule 56(2). Id. at 412-13, 605 A.2d at 1083 (citing
Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 593 A.2d 1241 (1990);
and Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 121 NJ. 276, 579 A.2d 1241
(1990)). Justice Pollock distinguished between the need for expert testimony in regular tort cases and the need in cases involving toxic tort litigation. Id. at 413, 605 A.2d at 1083. The justice
explained that the difficulty in proving causation in toxic-tort
cases gives rise to a greater need for expert testimony than in
ordinary tort actions. Id. Justice Pollock rationalized that injuries
in toxic tort cases often remain latent for many years and may be
attributed to a number of risk factors, thus frequently leaving the
disease's cause unclear. Id.
The court next analyzed the requirements of Evidence Rule
56(2) to explain the broad standard for determining the validity
of an expert's testimony in toxic-tort litigation. Id., 605 A.2d at
1084 (quoting N.J. EvID. R. 56(2)). The court declared that there
are three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony in tort cases. Id. First, the court recognized that the proffered expert testimony must regard subject matter that an
average juror would not comprehend. Id. Second, the court declared that expert must testify about a reliable field. Id. Finally,
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the court required that the expert, to testify at trial, must possess
sufficient expertise in the field. Id. at 413, 605 A.2d at 1084 (citing State v. Kelly, 97 NJ. 178, 208, 478 A.2d 364 (1984)).
Having set forth the general criteria for admitting expert testimony in tort cases, the court next specifically addressed the
standard for admitting expert testimony in toxic-tort cases. Id.
The court stated that the key to determining the admissibility of
an expert's testimony is the validity of the expert's reasoning and
methodology. Id. at 414, 605 A.2d at 1084 (citing Rubanick v.
Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 593 A.2d 733 (1991)). The court
observed that the new standard departed from its predecessor,
which had required that the expert's testimony be generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. The court expressed that
the new standard, by compelling an expert to explain his reasoning and methodology, would allow the trial court to determine
whether the proffered testimony was grounded in valid scientific
theory. Id. Justice Pollock stressed, however, that the trial court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the scientific community. Id. Rather, the justice posited that the trial court must
distinguish between scientifically-sound reasoning and testimony
based upon unsubstantiated personal belief. Id. (citing State v.
Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 447, 548 A.2d 1022 (1988)).
Justice Pollock next addressed the admissibility of an epidemiologist's testimony regarding causation in toxic-tort litigation.
Id. The court explained that epidemiologists utilize statistical information to predict the likelihood of disease in the human population. Id. at 415, 605 A.2d at 1085. Noting that statistical
associations alone do not always prove causation, the court stated
that evidence of a causal relationship is dependent upon the
weight of the statistical correlation and its consistency with
known scientific fact. Id. at 416, 605 A.2d at 1085. Accordingly,
the court stated that an epidemiologist must demonstrate the reliability of his findings and identify the basis for his conclusions
and methodologies at the Evidence Rule 8 hearing. Id. at 417,
605 A.2d at 1086.
Justice Pollock acknowledged that determining whether to
admit testimony based on epidemiological studies presents a trial
court with a difficult decision. Id. The court concluded, however,
that an expert who possesses the appropriate expertise in epidemiology, and who satisfies the stated requirements, may utilize
epidemiological studies to testify as to causation. Id. Additionally, the court held that a testifying medical expert may rely on
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sound epidemiological studies of the type reasonably relied upon
by other experts in the field. Id. at 419-20, 605 A.2d at 1087.
Thus, the court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered
the trial court to analyze each step of Wagoner's research. Id. at
421, 605 A.2d at 1088. Although the supreme court did not specifically declare that the testimony of both experts was admissible, it did require the trial court to reexamine the experts'
methodology and reasoning pursuant to the broad standard of
the Rubanick decision. Id.
In addition, the supreme court overruled the trial court's decision to compel the plaintiffs to choose whether to proceed
under the theories of strict liability and negligence, or simply
strict liability. Id. at 428, 605 A.2d at 1091. The court explained
that the basis of the plaintiff's strict liability claim was that the
defendants failed to adequately warn of the inherent dangers that
occur during exposure to asbestos. Id. The court stated that in
cases involving strict liability claims, culpability is irrelevant. Id.
(citing Bershada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447
A.2d 539 (1982)). Accordingly, the court noted, it abolished the
state of the art defense in asbestos cases in 1984. Id. at 425, 605
A.2d at 1090 (citing Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,
455, 479 A.2d 374 (1984)).
Finally, the court distinguished between abolishing the stateof-the-art defense in cases involving compensatory damage
claims based on the theory of strict liability and claims involving
punitive damage claims. Id. at 426, 605 A.2d at 1090 (citing
Fischer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 103 N.J. 643, 512 A.2d 466 (1986)).
The court declared that in cases of the latter variety, the state-ofthe-art defense could be utilized by the defendant. Id. The court
explained that strict liability claims revolve around a product's
safety, while punitive damage claims involve the defendant's
knowledge about the safety of its product. Id. Therefore, the
court declared, the plaintiff may submit evidence regarding the
defendant's knowledge even when pursuing compensatory damage claims and punitive damage claims. Id. The court asserted
that an adequately instructed jury will realize that a claim involving compensatory damages does not require the plaintiff to prove
defendant's knowledge, and that a punitive damage claim is dependent upon the defendant's knowledge. Id.
The Landrigan court expanded the already broad standard
for the admission of expert testimony as set forth in Rubanick.
The Rubanick decision allowed a biochemist to testify as to causa-
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tion in a toxic tort case. Rubanick, 125 N.J. at 454, 593 A.2d at
750. The biochemist in Rubanick had performed experiments on
animals, and proved that polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's)
caused colon cancer in those animals. Id. at 426, 593 A.2d at 735.
In contrast, Wagoner had never conducted specific research on
any living creatures; rather, his conclusions regarding the cause
of Landrigan's death were based on statistical inferences.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to allow expert
testimony based on statistical analysis is disquieting due to its potential for abuse. The key to the admission of such testimony is
whether it will "assist the trier of fact to understand evidence and
facts in issue." N.J. EVID. R. 56(2). Although a defendant can
impeach the credibility and attack the reasoning of an epidemiologist, the jury may be overly persuaded by potentially misleading
data. Furthermore, the sheer impact of an expert testifying
against what may be perceived as a large and powerful corporation could sway the jury in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, an epidemiologist's testimony, based on a causation ratio as low as thiry
percent, could significantly damage a defendant's case. Because
trial outcomes often turn on the persuasiveness of expert witnesses, there exists in each case the possibility that the jurors will
lend much credence in the opinions of expert witnesses, including a skillful statistician who can easily manipulate data so as to
confuse or impress the jury. To prevent abuse of the trial process, trial courts must carefully analyze the epidemiolgist's methodology and reasoning prior to admitting the testimony. In so
doing, the courts would take a significant step towards vindicating Rule 56's stated purpose of assisting, not misleading, the
trier of fact.
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